Arctic Security, Resilience, and Northern Cooperation
Thematic seminar report | 4 November 2026
Executive summary
The seminar explored how Arctic states and northern communities should respond to a more contested strategic environment. Participants from Nordic and Canadian perspectives connected military deterrence, surveillance and alliance cooperation to a broader understanding of resilience. They argued that enduring Arctic security depends on functional civilian infrastructure, social trust, preparedness, local and Indigenous knowledge, and predictable long-term investment.
The discussion highlighted Russia’s strategic capabilities in the European Arctic, the expanding risk of hybrid threats, and the importance of persistent situational awareness. Finland and Sweden offered examples of whole-of-society preparedness. Inuit perspectives stressed that communities cannot be expected to support sovereignty and surveillance while facing major gaps in water, housing and basic services. Climate change, resupply vulnerability and scientific cooperation cut across all these themes.
1. Strategic competition and Arctic security
Speakers described the Arctic as a region of rising geopolitical significance. The Norwegian contribution explained how geography shapes Russia’s access to open seas and why the High North matters for strategic submarines and nuclear deterrence. Russian military activity and the war in Ukraine were presented as central considerations for northern European security. A separate intervention pointed to broader great-power competition and increasing attention from China as access and activity change with the climate.
The resulting security agenda extends beyond conventional armed conflict. Participants referred to cyber incidents, sabotage, interference with navigation systems, and risks to pipelines, energy installations, communications and other critical assets. One speaker emphasized that credible deterrence should be paired with predictable conduct and respect for international law.
2. Military presence, surveillance and allied cooperation
Norway was presented as a vital contributor to observation and understanding of activity in the European High North. The Norwegian perspective emphasized persistent military and civilian presence, surveillance capacity, operational experience, and information sharing with allies. Iceland described its role as an allied host and strategic enabler despite lacking standing armed forces. Contributions cited included NATO air policing, radar and air surveillance systems, allied exercises, and submarine-related support.
The Canadian perspective stressed presence and domain awareness across vast northern distances. It referred to Canadian Rangers, aviation, surveillance systems and investments that would make northern operations more sustainable. Airfields, fuel, transport and supporting services were discussed as necessary conditions for effective military and civilian activity. Several speakers favored regular allied exercises rather than intermittent symbolic deployments.
3. Hybrid threats and the vulnerability of everyday systems
A recurring theme was that security threats can affect ordinary life without taking the form of a conventional attack. Discussants cited disruptions to digital networks, navigation, energy and other essential systems. A Swedish-oriented intervention used the example of a cyber incident affecting supermarket refrigeration to show the disproportionate consequences of service disruption in small, remote communities. Where there is only one food retailer, even a short loss of goods can become a serious community-level problem.
The point was not limited to deliberate threats. Isolation, long supply routes, severe weather and limited redundancy can turn a technical failure into a humanitarian or governance challenge. Resilience was therefore framed as the ability to keep essential social functions working under pressure.
4. Whole-of-society preparedness: Finland and Sweden
Finland’s representative described a comprehensive security model built around protecting the vital functions of society. Responsibility is shared across government, companies, civil society, the media and individuals. Examples presented included civilian shelters, cross-sector national defence courses, preparedness exercises, media literacy education and household emergency supplies. The model was described as rooted in geography, historical experience and a long-standing culture of readiness, rather than a blueprint that could simply be copied elsewhere.
The Swedish perspective outlined the rebuilding of total defence after a period of reduced preparedness. Military and civil defence were described as mutually reinforcing. Public information for households, guidance for companies, and shared planning by defence and civil preparedness authorities were cited as ways to make resilience an operational responsibility. Speakers noted that preparation for wartime disruption can also help societies manage natural disasters, technical crises and other emergencies.
5. Indigenous knowledge, sovereignty and community participation
An Inuit perspective emphasized ancestral and place-based knowledge, experience of living and travelling in difficult conditions, and rights and governance arrangements under modern treaties. Northern residents, harvesters, Canadian Rangers and Indigenous Guardians were described as critical sources of local understanding and observation. Their knowledge helps identify changes in routes, waters, conditions and activity that may be missed by outside observers or remote sensing alone.
The contribution also called attention to gaps between the importance assigned to local monitoring and the resources provided to those who undertake it. Participants argued for stronger recognition, professional support and more reliable funding of community-based roles. The discussion connected Indigenous participation not only to operational effectiveness but also to established political relationships and the recognition of Inuit presence and sovereignty-related contributions.
6. Infrastructure and human security as foundations of resilience
Speakers repeatedly linked Arctic defence to basic quality of life. Healthcare, education, employment, connectivity, roads, transport and housing were described as essential if northern regions are to remain inhabited and capable of sustaining local activity. For many communities, security policy cannot be separated from the reliability of everyday services.
A particularly forceful Inuit intervention raised water supply and housing constraints, referring to serious access problems and to conditions in Gjoa Haven. The speaker questioned the fairness and practicality of asking community members to serve as the eyes and ears of the state while households face long waits for fresh water. This example made clear that basic infrastructure is not peripheral to Arctic security. It is a prerequisite for meaningful participation in it.
A scientific contribution also described the seasonal resupply system used by many northern communities and stations. Changes in storms, sea conditions and logistics requirements place additional pressure on this narrow delivery window. Infrastructure planning must account for these interdependent risks.
7. Climate change, knowledge and international institutions
Climate change was presented as both a direct threat to northern livelihoods and infrastructure and a force altering access, activity and security demands. Participants pointed to changing sea-ice and ocean conditions, the need for better forecasting, and the importance of integrating observational science with practical knowledge from Arctic residents. The planned International Polar Year was mentioned as a potential platform for collaborative research and shared understanding.
The Arctic Council was described as an important intergovernmental forum even though it does not have a military defence mandate. Speakers stressed the value of maintaining rules-based cooperation and stable regional institutions despite wider geopolitical tensions. Allied defence cooperation and scientific or civilian cooperation were treated as distinct but complementary aspects of Arctic governance.
8. Political will, financing and future priorities
The Canadian military perspective identified political will and stable funding as major internal challenges. Infrastructure, surveillance, research and sustained presence require multi-year commitments, yet funding priorities can change. Speakers also warned against treating defence capabilities as sufficient in isolation. Institutions, relationships with local communities and public trust were identified as equally important assets.
The discussion suggested that investment decisions should consider both immediate military utility and longer-term civilian value. Airports, reliable fuel and supply chains, communications, water systems, housing, local training and emergency readiness can improve both operational capacity and community well-being.
Synthesis: principal findings
- Arctic security is a combined military, civilian and societal challenge, not a defence procurement problem alone.
- Persistent domain awareness depends on allied systems and on local residents with sustained knowledge of place.
- Hybrid threats exploit the same infrastructure weaknesses that make remote communities vulnerable to natural and technical disruptions.
- Finland and Sweden offer contrasting but instructive approaches to institutionalizing broad public preparedness.
- Indigenous participation must be supported by real resources, basic services and respect for governance arrangements.
- Climate projections, logistical resilience and cross-border research are integral to long-term security planning.
- Stable financing and predictable international cooperation are necessary to translate policy commitments into durable capacity.
Policy implications arising from the discussion
The following are analytical implications drawn from the seminar, not formally adopted recommendations or an agreed action plan.
- Assess proposed defence infrastructure against dual civilian and military benefits, including community access and service continuity.
- Fund Indigenous and community-based monitoring as sustained professional capacity rather than episodic or seasonal support.
- Build whole-of-society preparedness plans that name the roles of local governments, industry, civil society and households.
- Prioritize redundancy in water, food, power, transport and communications systems serving isolated communities.
- Connect Arctic climate and sea-ice research more directly to emergency planning, resupply forecasts and operational decisions.
- Maintain regular allied exercises, information sharing and lawful, predictable engagement while protecting spaces for Arctic scientific and institutional cooperation.